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Abstract 
 
This study is an empirical investigation of the extent of both mandatory and 
voluntary disclosure by listed banking companies in India. It also reports the results of the 
association between company-specific attributes and total disclosure, i.e., mandatory and 
voluntary, of the sample companies. A total of 184 items were selected of which 101 and 
81 were mandatory and voluntary respectively. The study revealed that in disclosing 
mandatory items, the average score is 88, whilst the average score for voluntary disclosure 
is 25. The findings also indicate that size, profitability, board composition, and market 
discipline variables are significant, and other variables such as age, complexity of business 
and asset-in-place are insignificant in explaining the level of disclosure. Results also 
indicate that Indian banks are very compliant with the rules regarding mandatory 
disclosure. In contrast, they are far behind in disclosing voluntary items. This paper has 
contributed to the academic literature, showing that the existence of a close monitoring 
system by regulatory authorities brings the potential for high compliance regarding 
disclosure and transparency, at least in mandatory cases. This study would be a good 
example for other developing countries, wanting to learn how Indian banks achieved this 
high level of compliance in mandatory disclosure. 
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1.  Introduction 
India is currently widely regarded as a new growth engine and an indispensable participant in the 
global economy. The economy of India is the fourth largest in the world as measured by Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP), with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of US $3.611 trillion. It is also the second 
fastest growing major economy in the world, with a GDP growth rate of 7.6% at the end of the first 
quarter of 2005–2006 (World Fact Book, 2006). The Indian financial system is characterised by a large 
network of commercial banks, financial institutions, stock exchanges, and a wide range of financial 
instruments (Agarwal, 2000). The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (henceforth Basel) 
released a document entitled ‘Enhancing Bank Transparency’ (BASEL, 1988), which considers 
transparency to be a key element of an effectively supervised, safe and sound banking system and 
recommends that banks, in regular financial reporting and other public disclosures, provide timely 
information which facilitates market participants’ assessment of banks. Therefore, adequate public 
disclosure facilitates a more efficient allocation of capital between banks, since it helps the market to 
660 Mohammed Hossain 
accurately assess and compare the risk and return prospects of individual banks. This study investigates 
the disclosure practices of banking companies in India to see to what extent they disclose mandatory 
and voluntary information, considering the existing banking Act, rules, and 
recommendations/guidelines of professional and/or regulatory institutions/bodies. In addition, it 
examines the association between company characteristics and the extent of disclosure. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the importance of 
disclosure in economics and accounting. Section 3 describes the regulatory environment for disclosure 
in India. Section 4 presents a review of the literature and develops the study’s hypotheses. The research 
design is outlined in Section 5. Section 6 presents the results and analysis. Finally, Section 7 presents 
the conclusions, limitations and directions for future research. 
 
 
2.  The Importance of Disclosure in Economic and Accounting Research 
The disclosure-related literature has developed into a distinct branch of economic and accounting 
research (Frolov, 2004). Following the taxonomy suggested by Verrecchia (2001), it is easy to 
distinguish three major research problems confronted by the literature. 
i. whether information disclosure is economically efficient in general; 
ii. the effect of information disclosure on the aggregate behaviour of economic agents; 
iii. the circumstances surrounding the decision to make private information public. 
Firstly, researchers have sought answers to the general question about whether information 
disclosure is economically efficient in general. In this respect, two theorists suggest differing 
explanations for the per-se desirability of information disclosure 1. On the one hand, Kunkel (1982) 
shows that in an economy including both production and exchange, information disclosure may by 
preferred because altered production plans lead to more efficient allocation of resources across time 
and firms. On the other hand, Diamond (1985) also suggests that in a pure exchange setting with costly 
acquisition of private information, the (costless) information disclosure is desirable because it will 
allow investors to economise on the acquisition of private information and make them better off, 
despite adverse risk-sharing effects. Secondly, the literature on disclosure-related research focuses on 
the effect of information disclosure on the aggregate behaviour of economic agents, and in particular 
on the behaviour of financial market aggregates like stock prices and trading volume. The literature 
attempts to explain empirically observed phenomena in the association between information disclosure 
and market responses, using plausible assumptions about diversity among market participants2. Finally, 
the disclosure literature devotes much attention to the circumstances surrounding the decision to make 
private information public. It is a standard argument here that management’s decision about whether to 
disclose information or not is based on weighing expected costs and benefits of making the information 
public (Frolov, 2004). The available literature has suggested many ways that a firm or its management 
can benefit from improved disclosure. For example, direct evidence that firms increase the intensity of 
their disclosure efforts before offering public debt and equity has been obtained by Lang and 
Lundholm (1993, 1996), Frankel et al. (1995), Healy et al. (1999), etc. The list of other suggested 
explanations of voluntary information disclosure includes motives related to institutional factors and 
signalling to the market.3 
The above discussion shows that while information disclosure is socially desirable (Frolov, 
2004; Diamond, 1985), the interplay between its benefits and costs may lead to partial or no disclosure, 
and one therefore should ask whether the disclosure should be voluntary or mandatory. Indeed, the 
                                                 
1 Early literature on disclosure suggested that since under the simultaneous assumptions of pure exchange and perfect market competition, information 
disclosure may lead only to wealth redistribution among agents, this leaves no place for disclosure-based (weak) Pareto improvements (Verrecchia, 
2001). 
2 For an elaboration on this direction of research see, e.g., Verrecchia (2001). 
3 As surveyed by Healy and Palepu (2001), the management of firms may also be interested in improved disclosure since it reduces the risk of premature 
resignation because of poor stock performance (e.g., studies by Palepu, 1986; Morck et al, 1990) and the cost of litigation (Skinner, 1994), increases the 
value of the management’s stock options (Noe, 1999; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000; Miller and Piotroski, 2000), and facilitates more signals to the market 
about the superior strategic management abilities of the COEs (Trueman, 1986). 
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economic and accounting literature has asserted that in the view of informational asymmetry, (costless) 
disclosure of private information brings general gains in economic efficiency. However, the size of the 
gains and the ultimate effect on financial prices may vary considerably depending on the 
‘informativeness’ of disclosed information and on the ways the information is disseminated and used. 
 
 
3.  Environments of Financial Reporting in India 
The financial reporting and disclosure of banking companies in India are regulated by the Companies 
Act 1956, the Banking Regulation Act 1949, the rules of the Securities and Exchange Board of India 
(hereafter SEBI), and the guidelines of the Reserve Bank of India (hereafter RBI), as well as the 
recommendations of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI). The Banking Regulation 
Act 1949 provides a framework for regulation and supervision of commercial banking activity. Section 
29(1) of the Banking Regulation Act 1949 states that at the expiration of each calendar year, every 
banking company shall prepare a balance sheet and profit and loss account, in the forms set out in the 
Third Schedule Form A and Form B of the Act respectively. Section 30(1) states that the balance sheet 
and profit and loss account should be prepared in accordance with Section 29 and audited by a person 
duly qualified under law. Section 31(1) also states that the accounts and balance sheet, together with 
the auditor's report, shall be published in the prescribed manner and three copies thereof shall be 
furnished as returns to the RBI within three months from the end of the period. Section 32 requires that 
three copies of the accounts and balance sheet, together with the auditor's report, should be sent to the 
Registrar of Company Affairs. 
The SEBI monitors and regulates corporate governance of listed companies in India through 
Clause 49. This clause is incorporated in the listing agreement of stock exchanges with companies and 
it is compulsory for them to comply with its provisions 4. Under Clause 49, there is a requirement for a 
separate section on Corporate Governance in the Annual Reports of companies, and for a detailed 
compliance report on Corporate Governance. This report contains nine sections dealing with the board 
of directors, audit committee, remuneration of directors, shareholders’ grievance committee, general 
body meeting (board procedure), disclosure of related parties, means of communication, general 
shareholders’ information, others including risk management, management discussion and analysis, 
information and compliance respectively. It is also noted that the company must obtain a certificate 
from either the auditors or practising company secretaries regarding compliance of conditions of 
corporate governance as stipulated in this clause, and annex the certificate with the directors’ report, 
which is sent annually to all the shareholders of the company. The same certificate must also be sent to 
the Stock Exchanges along with the annual report filed by the company. 
The RBI is committed to enhancing and improving the levels of transparency and disclosure in 
banks’ annual accounts. In addition to its traditional central banking functions, the RBI has certain 
non-monetary functions regarding the nature of banks’ supervision, and the promotion of sound 
banking in India. The Reserve Bank Act 1934, and the Banking Regulation Act 1949 invested the RBI 
with wide powers of supervision and control over commercial banks, relating to licensing and 
establishments, branch expansion, liquidity of their assets, management and methods of working, 
amalgamation, reconstruction, and liquidation. Consequently, it is authorised to carry out periodical 
inspections of the banks and to call for returns and necessary information from them. 
There are two professional bodies working in India, these being, the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants of India (ICAI), and the Institute of Cost and Works Accountants of India (ICWAI). 
Accounting practices in India conform with the Accounting Standards set by the ICAI, and to date, 28 
standards have been adopted in India. According to ICAI, India is materially in conformity with the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA). The 
                                                 
4 All listed companies with paid up capital of Rs 30 million (USD 660,000) or with a net worth of Rs 250 million (USD 5.5 million) must comply with 
Clause 49. There are mandatory and non-mandatory requirements. 
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ICWAI is the only recognised statutory professional organisation and licensing body in India 
specialising exclusively in Cost and Management Accountancy. 
Capital markets in India comprise equity, debt, foreign exchange and derivatives markets. India 
has the number one ranking in terms of listed securities on the Exchanges, followed by the USA (NSE, 
2004). As at the end of March, 2004, there were 9,368 trading members registered with SEBI with 
10,100 companies listed (Annual Report of SEBI, 2004). There are 23 stock exchanges in India, the 
two major ones being the Bombay Stock Exchange (now called The Stock Exchange, Mumbai, 
hereafter BSE), and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). The BSE is the oldest stock exchange in Asia 
established in 1878. Listed companies must comply with the rules and regulations prescribed by the 
Securities and Exchange Board of India Act 1992. Indeed, under the Company Act, management must 
explain any deviations from the prescribed accounting standards in the financial statements. The 
sanctions for non-compliance with financial disclosure regulations range from a maximum fine of Rs 
2,000 (USD 44) to imprisonment of up to six months. If the auditor’s signed reports do not conform 
with the law, the maximum penalty is Rs 10,000 (USD 220). 
 
 
4.  Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses 
There has been extensive research in the advanced, and developing countries to measure the corporate 
disclosure in financial and non-financial companies. (See for example, Cerf, 1961; Singhvi and Desai, 
1971; Buzby, 1974; Kahl and Belkaoui, 1981; Marston, 1986; Wallace, 1987; Cooke, 1989a, 1989b, 
1991, 1992, 1993; Malone et al., 1993; Hossain et al., 1994; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Wallace and 
Naser, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Craig and Diga, 1998; Hossain, 2000; Hossain, 2001; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Akhtaruddin, 2005). 
However, the study of Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) was comprehensive, investigating the overall 
extent of disclosure by 70 banks located in 18 countries. Their results indicated that the extent of 
disclosure was different among the countries examined, and that there was a positive relationship 
between size of the bank and the level of disclosure indicated. Hossain (2001) empirically investigates 
the extent of disclosure of 25 banks in Bangladesh and associations between company size, 
profitability, and audit firm with disclosure level. A total of 61 items of information, both voluntary 
and mandatory, were included in the disclosure index, and the approach to scoring items was 
dichotomous. The results showed that size and profitability of the banks are statistically significant in 
determining their disclosure levels. However, the audit firm variable was not significant at 
conventional levels in the model. Chipalkatti (2002) examined the association between the nature and 
quality of annual report disclosures made by 17 Indian banks and market microstructure variables. He 
constructed a Bank Transparency Score (BTS) consisting of 90 items of information considering the 
recommendations of the Basel committee and IAS 30. The study showed no significant association 
between the level of disclosure and percentage of shares held by the government, and the percentage of 
shares held by foreign shareholders respectively. The results also indicated that larger banks provide 
more transparent disclosure and there was no significant difference in the disclosure scores of banks 
across profitability levels, but banks with lower levels of leverage did have significantly higher 
disclosure scores. Baumann and Nier (2003) addressed the issues of developing a set of disclosure 
requirements by Pillar 3 of Basel II that improved market participants’ ability to assess a bank’s value 
using a unique dataset on almost 600 banks in 31 countries over the period 1993-2000 5. The dataset 
contains detailed information about the items disclosed by banks in their annual accounts. They 
constructed a composite disclosure index that informs about disclosure at the bank level, and they then 
analysed each of the 17 sub-indices of disclosure that make up the composite index in order to 
investigate which, if any, items of the banks’ balance sheet disclosure are most beneficial from the 
point of view of the bank and most useful for financial markets. Their findings generally confirm the 
                                                 
5 These are Australia, Australia, Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, the UK and the 
US. 
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hypotheses that disclosure decreases stock volatility, increases market values, and increases the 
usefulness of company accounts in predicting valuations. Based on the results of prior empirical 
research, the special characteristics of banking companies, and data availability, nine hypotheses were 
developed for this study, a detailed analysis of which is now presented. 
 
4.1 Age 
The extent of a company’s disclosure may be influenced by its age, i.e. stage of development and 
growth (Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Akhtaruddin, 2005). Owusu-Ansah (1998, p. 605) pointed out three 
factors that may contribute to this phenomenon. Firstly, younger companies may suffer competition, 
secondly, the cost and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the required information 
may be a contributory factor, and finally, younger companies may lack a track record on which to rely 
for public disclosure. Kakani et al. (2001) pointed out that newer and smaller firms, as a result, take to 
the market in spite of disadvantages like their lack of capital, brand name and reputation with older 
firms. However, it is not possible to reach a conclusion that long-established banks can disclose more 
information or be more compliant than newly-established banks. This leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Long-established banks may disclose more information than newly-established banks. 
 
4.2. Size 
The size of the bank is a potentially important explanatory variable in relation to the extent of 
disclosure. Most researchers in this area find a close relationship between these two variables, both in 
developing and developed countries. (See for example, Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Kahl and Belkaoui, 
1981; Cooke 1989a, 1992; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994; Hossain et al., 1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Craig 
and Diga, 1998; Hossain, 2000; Hossain, 2001). In this body of a research, a positive relationship has 
been found between company size and the extent of disclosure. A number of reasons have been 
advanced in the literature in an attempt to justify this relationship on a priori grounds. For example, 
Singhvi and Desai (1971, p.131) offered three justifications for the variations in the extent of financial 
disclosure in firms of different sizes. Firstly, the cost of accumulating certain information is greater for 
small firms than for large firms. Secondly, larger firms have a greater need for disclosure because their 
securities are typically distributed via a more diverse network of exchanges, and thirdly, management 
of a smaller corporation is likely to believe more strongly than the management of a larger corporation, 
that the full disclosure of information could endanger its competitive position. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is established. 
H2: Banks with different values of total assets disclose varying amounts of financial information. 
 
4.3. Profitability 
Most researchers have found a positive relationship between profitability and the extent of disclosure. 
(See for example, Cerf, 1961; Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Belkaoui and Khal, 1981; 
Wallace et al., 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; Hossain, 2000; and 
Hossain 2001). Banks are engaged in the kind of business where returns are expected. The profit-
earning mechanism depends inter alia on how effectively the banks conduct their lending and 
borrowing activities. The following hypothesis has thus been established: 
H3: Banks with higher profit disclose financial information to a greater extent than do those 
banks with lower or negative profit. 
 
4.4. Complexity of Business 
Haniffa and Cook (2002) argued that structural complexity has a significant influence on the extent of 
disclosure. Such complexity requires a firm to have an effective management information system for 
monitoring purposes (Courtis, 1978; Cooke, 1989a) and the availability of such a system helps to 
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reduce the cost of information per unit, thereby providing the expectation of higher disclosure. Here, 
structural complexity is defined as the actual number of subsidiaries, as evident in Indian banks. In this 
respect, it is hypothesised that: 
H4: Banks with subsidiaries may disclose more banks without subsidiaries. 
 
4.5 Assets-in-place 
Hossain (2000) and Hossain and Mitra (2004) found assets-in-place systematically influence the level 
of disclosure. Butler et al. (2002) argued that firms with a higher percentage of tangible assets have 
lower agency costs because it is more difficult for managers to misappropriate well-defined assets in 
place than to extract value from uncertain growth opportunities. Therefore, since these firms have 
lower agency costs, they can reduce their reliance on disclosures. An increase in the firm’s fixed assets 
results in lower in agency costs, and consequently lower disclosure (Myers, 1977). Therefore, the 
following hypothesis has been established: 
H5: There is a negative association between the proportion of assets-in-place and the extent of 
disclosure of information. 
 
4.6. Board Composition 
Board composition might be an interesting variable to consider because it will indirectly reflect the role 
of non-executive directors (Haniffa and Cook, 2002, p. 320). The premise of agency theory is that 
boards are needed to monitor and control the actions of directors due to their opportunistic behaviour 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Mangel and Singh (1993) believe that outside 
directors have more opportunity for control and face a more complex web of incentives, stemming 
directly from their responsibilities as directors and augmented by their equity position. Others who also 
see the role of non-executive directors as monitors/controllers of management’s performance and 
actions, include Fama and Jensen (1983), Brickley and James (1987), Weisbach (1988), and Pearce and 
Zahra (1992). Additionally, outside directors may be considered to be decision experts (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983), may reduce managerial consumption of pre-requisites (Brickley and James, 1987), will 
not be intimidated by the CEO (Weisbach, 1988), and act as a positive influence over the directors’ 
deliberations and decisions (Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Thus, it is hypothesised that: 
H6: There is a positive association between the proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board and the extent of disclosure of information. 
 
4.7. Market Discipline 
In recent years, considerable attention has been paid to the topic of market discipline in banking (Nier 
and Baumann, 2003; Ghosh and Das, 2000). Market discipline refers to a market-based incentive 
scheme in which investors in banking liabilities, such as subordinated debt or uninsured deposits, 
‘punish’ banks for greater risk-taking by demanding higher yields on those liabilities (Nier and 
Baumann, 2003). Market discipline in the banking sector can be described as ‘private counter party 
supervision’ (Greenspan, 2001). There are a number of potential benefits from enhancing market 
discipline in a country’s banking sector. Firstly, by punishing excessive risk-taking by banks, increased 
market discipline may reduce moral hazard incentives. Secondly, market discipline may improve the 
efficiency of banks by pressurising some of the relatively inefficient banks to become more efficient or 
to exit the industry (Berger, 1991). Thirdly, evidence indicates that markets give signals about the 
credit standings of financial firms, which, combined with inside information gained by supervisory 
procedures, can increase the efficacy of the overall supervisory process. Finally, market discipline 
might be able to supplement traditional supervisory assessments to distinguish ‘good’ banks from ‘bad’ 
ones and therefore, lower the overall social costs of bank supervision (Flannery, 2001). Since India has 
made significant efforts to promote the role of market forces in regulating banks, it is expected that 
banks are committed to provide more information in the annual reports. Cordella and Yeyati (1998) 
and Boot and Schmeits (2000), pointed to the commitment effect of bank disclosure. According to 
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them, banks that disclose more information choose lower default risk in equilibrium. The idea is that a 
bank that discloses its risk profile exposes itself to market discipline and will, therefore, be penalised 
by investors for choosing higher risk. This effect is absent if investors do not know the risk profile of 
the bank and weaker if the amount of information available to investors is limited. India, in the last 
decade, has undergone a liberalisation of the banking sector with the avowed objective of “enhancing 
efficiency, productivity and profitability” (RBI, 1991). From the above discussion, it has been 
understood that the bank regulator measures the bank-specific variables, in other words, measures the 
bank’s risk exposure referred to as the CAMEL rating, which captures certain characteristics of market 
discipline. CAMEL is the acronym for Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management Competence, 
Earnings and Liquidity, and covers the five major parameters of bank operations6. Most studies 
(Sinkey, 1975; and Espahbodi, 1991) conclude that CAMEL ratings generally reflect the soundness of 
financial institutions. However, in the absence of published CAMEL data, two alternative variables 
have been chosen, i.e., Non-performing assets (NPA) and Capital adequacy ratio (CAR). An NPA is 
defined in India as an asset with interest or principal repayment instalment unpaid for a period of at 
least two quarters. NPAs form a substantial burden for individual banks as well as for a country’s 
banking system generally. They represent the poor quality of bank’s assets, have to be provisioned for 
through the use of its capital. In order, to ensure uninterrupted good performance of financial 
institutions, the regulatory authorities have specified the minimum capital for such institutions, by a 
requirement called Capital Adequacy. The RBI has specified this for banks and the SEBI in turn, has 
prescribed the Capital Adequacy for all financial intermediaries under its regulatory authority. If banks 
can maintain NPA and CAR at acceptable levels, this might have an impact on disclosure. It is not 
clear what to expect in terms of this variable, but the hypothesis can be established as follows: 
H 7: Banks with lower NPA and/or minimum CAR will disclose more information and be more 
compliant than banks with higher NPA/CAR. 
 
 
5.  Method 
5.1 Selection of Sample 
The study focuses on the banking sector in India. On 30th June 2004, the total number of banking 
companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE), was 
38, of which 18 were public sector and 20 private sector banks. There are 23 recognised stock 
exchanges in India, only two of which are considered by the researchers in this study, these being the 
BSE and NSE., for the following reasons. The BSE is the India’s second largest stock exchange, the 
oldest stock exchange in Asia, second on the basis of listed companies in the world, the third largest 
nation in respect of share holding population, and fourth in terms of capitalisation (Ganesan 1994, 
p.177), and the NSE was established as a model exchange to provide nation-wide services to investors. 
Hence, the actual sample represents about 100% of the population of banking companies listed on the 
stock exchanges. Annual reports for the year 2002-03 were collected through a service provider in PDF 
format. 
 
5.2. Scoring of the Disclosure Index 
Both a weighted disclosure index and an unweighted disclosure index are usually used to determine 
disclosure level. Researchers such as Wallace et al. (1994), Cooke (1991 and 1992), Karim (1995), 
Hossain et al (1994), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), and Hossain (2000 and 2001), adopted a 
dichotomous procedure in which an item scores one if disclosed and zero if not disclosed and this 
approach is conventionally termed the unweighted approach. The weighted disclosure approach (used 
by for example by Barrett, 1977, and Marston, 1986), involves the application of weights above zero 
                                                 
6 For example, Capital adequacy is measured by the ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets (CRAR), Asset Quality is the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans (GNPA), to account for management quality, the ratio of non-interest expenditures to total assets (MGNT) reflects management ability, 
Earnings is the return on asset ratio, and the cash plus balances with central bank to total asset ratio (LQD) is included as an indicator of bank liquidity. 
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but less than one to items of information which are disclosed (zero is the weight for non-disclosure). 
Previous experiences also show that the use of unweighted and weighted scores for the items disclosed 
in the annual reports and accounts can make little or no difference to the findings (Coombs and Tayib, 
1998). 
Thus, we have chosen the unweighted disclosure index methodology. In this case, the key fact 
is whether or not a company discloses an item of information in the annual report. If a banking 
company discloses an item of information in its annual report, then ‘1’ will be awarded and if the item 
is not disclosed, then ‘0’ will be awarded. Thus, the unweighted disclosure method measures the total 
disclosure (TD) score of a banking company as additive (suggested by Cooke, 1992) as follows: 
TD= di
i
n
=
∑
1
 
Where, 
d = 1 if the item di is disclosed 
0 = if the item is not disclosed 
n = number of items 
However, the fundamental theme of the unweighted disclosure index is that all items of 
information in the index are considered equally important to the average user. The Disclosure Index 
has been proved in appendix 1. 
 
5.3. The Selection of Mandatory Items 
The following criteria have been followed to select the mandatory items of information. Both 
quantitative and qualitative items in the annual reports of the sample banks are considered. Under the 
following criteria, the total items of mandatory information come to 101 (See Table 1) 
 
Table 1: The Selection of Mandatory Items in the Disclosure Index 
 
Main sources of information Items identified as Mandatory by categories wise (Numbers) Total 
Balance sheet 13 Banking Companies Act, 1949 Profit and Loss Account 07 20 
Company Act, 1956. Director’s report 5 5 
Listing Rules - Clause 49 Corporate Governance Report 44 44 
Company Act 1956 The Management Discussion and Analysis 08 08 
RBI guidelines Circular issued  24 24 
Grand Total 101 
 
5.4. The Selection of Voluntary Items 
Research that focuses on voluntary disclosure of financial companies is almost absent. Some studies 
have considered the social reporting of financial companies including Islamic banks (Harahap, 2003; 
Maali et al., 2006). 
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Table 2: The Selection of Voluntary Items in the Disclosure Index 
 
 Titles  Sources cited as example 
1 Background about the bank 06 Kahl and Belkaoui (1981); Ahmed and Nicholls (1994); Singhvi (1968) 
2 Corporate strategies 03 Craig and Diga (1998) 
3 Corporate governance 11 Haniffa and Cooke (2002); BASEL (1999) 
4 Financial performance 13 Cooke (1991, 1992); BASEL (1998) 
5 General Risk management 07 BASEL (1999); Chipalkatti (2002) 
6 Credit risk exposure 08 BASEL (2003); Chipalkatti (2002) 
7 Market risk exposure  04 BASEL (1999); Chipalkatti (2002) 
8 Interest rate risk 03 BASEL (1999); Chipalkatti (2002) 
9 Currency risk 03 BASEL (1999); Chipalkatti (2002) 
10 Liquidity risk exposure 03 BASEL (1999); Chipalkatti (2002) 
11 Accounting policy review 02 BASEL (1998); Hossain et al. (1995) 
12 Corporate social disclosure 04 McGrath (2003); Peterson and Hermans (2004) 
13 Key non-financial statistics 08 Inchausti (2000); Hossain (2001); 
14 Others 08 Hossain (2001); Kahl and Belkaoui (1981) 
Grand Total 83  
 
However, the international financial institutions like the IMF, and World Bank, have also given 
importance to the transparency and disclosure of financial companies. Similarly, other organisations 
like the US FSAB, the US Federal Reserve System, and the ‘Standard and Poor’ have also published 
guidelines regarding disclosing voluntary items. Table 2 that follows, is the list of chosen voluntary 
items, with their sources mentioned as examples. 
Having considered the above factors, a total of 83 items under 14 categories of voluntary 
information were identified as relevant and could be expected to be disclosed in the annual reports of 
India’s banking institutions. The total list of the 83 voluntary items is presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Disclosure Score of Mandatory and Voluntary Items 
 
Public Sector Banks Mandatory Disclosure Score (101) 
Voluntary 
Disclosure Score (83) 
Total Disclosure 
Score (184) 
Rank According 
to score 
1. Allahabad Bank 84 27 58 10 
2.Andhra Bank 86 33 62 7 
3. Bank of Baroda 97 31 67 3 
4. Bank of India 94 31 66 4 
5. Canara Bank 80 33 59 9 
6. Corporation Bank 98 43 73 1 
7. Dena Bank 74 17 48 15 
8. Indian Overseas Bank 83 24 57 11 
9. Oriental Bank of Commerce 83 41  64 
10. Punjab National Bank 91 31 64 5 
11. Syndicate Bank 88 29 61 8 
12. Union Bank of India 84 35 62 7 
13. Vijaya Bank 81 27 57 11 
14. State Bank of India 89 31 63 6 
15. State Bank of Bikaner and 
Jaipur 86 27 59 9 
16. State Bank of Indore 83 19 54 14 
17. State Bank of Mysore 79 24 54 14 
18. State Bank of Travancore 93 24 61 8 
Private Sector Banks     
19. Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. 94 40 70 2 
20. City Union Bank Ltd. 88 22 59 9 
21. Dhanalakshmi Bank Ltd. 86 23 58 10 
22. Federal Bank Ltd. 85 22 57 11 
23. ING Vysya Bank Ltd. 91 35 66 4 
24 Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd. 89 22 59 9 
25. Karnataka Bank Ltd. 92 13 56 12 
26. Karur Vysya Bank Ltd.13 89 19 58 10 
27. Lakshmi Vilas Bank Ltd. 89 15 55 13 
28. South Indian Bank Ltd. 93 29 64 5 
29. United Western Bank Ltd. 88 13 54 14 
30. Bank of Punjab Ltd. 88 14 55 13 
31. Centurion Bank Ltd. 88 13 54 14 
32. Global Trust Bank Ltd. 98 27 66 4 
33. HDFC Bank Ltd. 91 18 58 10 
34. ICICI Bank Ltd. 92 33 66 4 
35. IDBI Bank Ltd. 86 25 59 9 
36. Indusland Bank Ltd. 96 25 63 6 
37. Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. 91 21 59 9 
38. UTI Bank Ltd. 94 26 63 6 
 
5.5. Model Development 
The following Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model is to be fitted to the data in order to 
assess the effect of each variable on the disclosure level: 
Y = β0 + β1 X 1 + β2X2 +β3X3 + β4X4 + β5X5 + β6X6 + β7X7 +β8X8 +e 
Where Y = total disclosure score received for each bank 
β0 =the intercept; e = the error term 
Table 4 reports the proxies used for independent variables and the predicted direction of the 
relation with the extent of disclosure, for each hypothesis. 
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Table 4: Proxies and Predicted Signs for Explanatory Variables 
 
Hypotheses Predicted Signs Proxies 
Age + Age of the banks in years 
Size + Logarithm of total assets 
Profitability + Return on assets 
Complexity of business + Actual number of subsidiaries 
Assets-in-place - Book value of net fixed assets to book value of total assets 
Board Composition + Ratio of non-executive independent directors to total number of directors on the Board 
± = Capital adequacy ratio Market discipline ± = Non-performing assets to total assets ratio 
 
 
6.  Univariate Analysis 
6.1 Level of Disclosure 
Table 5 reports the descriptive statistics of the disclosure scores (dependent variables). On average, 
banks publish 60% of the total disclosure of which 88% are mandatory and 25% are voluntary items. 
The overall level of disclosure including the ranking of the bank according to the disclosure score is 
presented in Table 3. The highest score is obtained by a the Corporation Bank (a public sector bank), 
whilst the second highest is obtained by the Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. (a private sector bank). However, 
the lowest score is obtained by a public sector bank, i.e. Dena Bank. The overall disclosure scores 
range from 48 to 73 and the mean value is 60.21. The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5. 
The highest score (98) of mandatory items is obtained jointly by two banks, these being the 
Corporation Bank, and the Global Trust Bank Ltd., belonging to the public and private sector 
respectively. It is also noted that mandatory items score of the public sector banks ranged from 74 to 
98 with a mean and standard deviation of 86.27 and 6.433 respectively, while the mandatory items 
score of private sector banks is in the range 85 to 98 with a mean and standard deviation of 90.40 and 
3.47 respectively. In the case of voluntary disclosure, it is seen that the Corporation Bank also gains the 
highest score (48). Among the private sector banks, the highest score of voluntary items (40) is 
obtained by the Bank of Rajasthan Ltd. The average number of voluntary items disclosed by the public 
and private sector banks are 29.27 and 22.75 respectively with respective standard deviations of 6.65 
and 7.58 (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Disclosure Scores 
 
 Mean Std. dev Range No. of banks 
Total Disclosure Score 60.21 5.06 48 - 73 38 
Mandatory disclosure score 88.65 5.56 74 - 98 38 
Voluntary disclosure score 25.84 7.80 13 - 43 38 
Mandatory disclosure score of Public banks 86.27 6.43 74 - 98 18 
Mandatory disclosure score of Private banks 90.40 3.43 85 - 98 20 
Voluntary disclosure score of Public banks 29.27 6.65 17 - 43 18 
Voluntary disclosure score of private banks 22.75 7.58 13 - 40 20 
 
6.2 Correlation Matrix and Multicollinearity Analysis 
Multicollinearity in explanatory variables has been diagnosed through analyses of correlation factors 
and Variable Inflation Factors (VIF), consistent with Weisberg (1985). Table 6 presents the correlation 
matrix of the dependent and continuous variables, from which, it has been observed that the highest 
simple correlation between independent variables was 0. 80 between NPA and Age. Judge et al. 
(1985), and Bryman and Cramer (1997) suggest that simple correlation between independent variables 
should not be considered harmful until they exceed 0.80 or 0.90. Simple correlations of 0.80 or 0.90 
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are usually associated with Variable Inflation Factors (VIF) 7 of between 6 and 10. The VIF in excess 
of 10 should be considered an indication of harmful multicollinearity (Neter et al., 1989). In the present 
model, the largest VIF was observed in NPA at 4.892. The condition indices remained relatively low, 
staying below 10, and the highest variance contribution associated with the highest condition index 
was 0.618 (subsdia). The remaining variance contributions were less than 0.60. Therefore, the observed 
correlations were not considered harmful. These findings suggest that multicollinearity between the 
independent variables is unlikely to pose a serious problem in the interpretation of the results of the 
multivariate analysis. 
 
Table 6: Correlations Matrix 
 
 AGE LOGASSE ROA BOD NPA CAR AINPLACE SUBSIDIA 
AGE 1 .363(*) .253 .185 .033 .354(*) .198 -.234 
LOGASSE .363(*) 1 .256 -.343(*) -.210 .554(**) .198 .140 
ROA .253 .256 1 .031 -.800(**) .238 .170 .226 
BOD .185 -.343(*) .031 1 .277(*) -.262 -.398(**) -.293(*) 
NPA .033 -.210 -.800(**) .277(*) 1 -.252 -.347(*) -.376(*) 
CAR .354(*) .554(**) .238 -.262 -.252 1 .289(*) -.031 
AINPLACE .198 .198 .170 -.398(**) -.347(*) .289(*) 1 .412(**) 
SUBSIDIA -.234 .140 .226 -.293(*) -.376(*) -.031 .412(**) 1 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
6.3. Multivariate Analysis 
We performed an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression model for all variables, the results of which 
are presented in Table 7. The multiple regression model is significant (P0.005). The adjusted 
coefficient of determination (R squared) indicates that 41% of the variation in the dependent variable is 
explained by variations in the independent variables. The coefficient representing assets (log of assets), 
ROA, BOD, NPA, CAR are statically significant between 1% to 6% level, while the coefficients for 
age, complexity of business and assets-in place are not statistically significant at 10%. 
 
Table 7: MODEL 
 
 R R Square Change Statistics 
Model   Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate R Square Change 
1 .734(a) .538 .411 3.88541 .734(a) 
a Predictors: (Constant), CAR, SUBSIDIA, ROA, BOD, AGE, AINPLACE, LOGASSE, NPA 
b Dependent Variable: DINDEX 
Coefficients 
Model  Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics  
B Std. Error Beta   Tolerance VIF  
1 (Constant) 44.083 6.260  7.042 .000  
AGE .001 .025 .009 .050 .961 .487 2.052 
LOGASSE 2.692 .570 .819 4.721 .001 .528 1.892 
ROA -437.483 146.620 -.809 -2.984 .006 .217 4.619 
SUBSIDIA -.064 .164 -.063 -.390 .699 .618 1.618 
AINPLACE 2.437 1.946 .214 1.252 .221 .546 1.831 
BOD 11.364 4.578 .424 2.483 .019 .546 1.831 
NPA -117.874 39.088 -.842 -3.016 .005 .204 4.892 
CAR -1.869 .559 -.550 -3.345 .002 .589 1.699 
a Dependent Variable: DINDEX 
 
                                                 
7 VIF measures the variance of an estimator compared to what the variance would have been if the independent variable was not collinear with any of the 
other explanatory variables (Aczel, 1993). 
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6.4. Discussion of Regression Results 
The adjusted R square of 0.411 compares favourably with similar studies using disclosure indices. The 
higher adjusted R square statistic is found in the study of Haniffa and Cooke (2002) at 46.3%, Ahmed 
(1996) at 33.2%, and Akhtaruddin (2005) at 55.7%. 
The age variable is not significant. A similar result was found in Akhtaruddin (2005). This 
implies that the level of disclosure is not affected by the age of the bank or the number of years it has 
in business. Size by assets is statistically related to the level of information disclosed by the sample of 
banks in their annual reports. It is significant at a 1% level. The variable assets size (log of assets) was 
significantly positive and in line with the results from previous research as mentioned. The positive 
sign on the coefficient suggests that size has a direct influence on level of disclosure in the banking 
sector in India. The sign of the correlation coefficient of Profitability, as predicted, was positive and is 
significant at 1%. This is consistent with the view that more profitable banking companies disclose 
significantly more financial information than do less profitable ones. The result is also consistent with 
other previous studies such as Cerf (1961), Singhvi and Desai (1971), and Abu-Naser and Rutherford 
(1994). Complexity of Business is not significant. Therefore, this provides evidence that if the bank has 
subsidiaries at home and abroad, it is unlikely to disclose more information than a bank with no 
subsidiaries. The hypothesis for assets-in-place, is rejected. Board composition is also significant at 
2%, as predicted. The two variables of NPA and CAR have been taken as a proxy for market 
discipline, the results showing that they are both significant at 5% and 2% respectively, but with 
negative signs. This situation indicates that the level of disclosure is adversely related to these 
variables. The reason may be the managements’ conservative motives. For instance, in order to 
maintain standard NPA and CAR ratios as set by RBI guidelines, the bank may pursue low returns 
investments in the hope that a reduction in risk may compensate for the lowering of returns. Therefore, 
in this case banks will unwillingly limit their voluntary disclosure of information regarding future 
strategies, policies, profit margin and credit risk policy, to their shareholders, investors and depositors, 
but the regulatory bodies will be satisfied with the performance. Furthermore, the presence of a large 
number of public sector banks (47%), and the number of government shareholders may be another 
reason. The reality is that the government as a shareholder, does not clearly articulate its expectations 
at the time the institution is formed. The problem is further complicated by the fact that governments 
change and, therefore, there is a real risk of changes in expectations. If the expectations of the 
government shareholder are such, and they often are, that it impairs the economic viability of the entity 
itself, and the government hesitates in infusing the required resources, it could have grave 
consequences for the future of the entity. As a consequence, it is evident that there is a negative 
relationship between the degree of state ownership of banks and financial development (Barth et al., 
2000). Barth et al. (2000) have also concluded that the greater the share of bank assets controlled by 
state-owned banks, on average, the less their financial development. The above evidence implies that 
government owned banks are complying with the rules. Thus, the better the compliance to the rules, 
the lesser the incentives for disclosing information. Finally, the central motivation of market discipline 
is that bank owners and managers act conservatively to limit bank risk. If risk increases and depositors 
demand higher interest rates or withdraw, then discipline has been effective if banks react to it by 
reducing bank risk. However, since deposits are the major source of funds for banks, depositors’ 
actions may lead the banks to align their risk-taking incentives with those of depositors. This is known 
as market discipline, a key complement for the discipline imposed by supervisors. Because of the 
supervisory actions, and depositors’ reaction, banks usually keep to ratings in the favourable position. 
This certainly implies a lower degree of disclosure, especially voluntary disclosure. 
 
 
7.  Conclusion and Limitations 
The nature and focus of the present research is quite interesting and different from other studies. In 
other words, in order to maintain high quality disclosure and transparency, as well as to build up 
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investors and depositors’ confidence, it is imperative to comply with the rules and regulations of the 
regulatory authorities. In addition, the guidelines/recommendations issued by the international 
organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, BASEL, IASC etc., should be followed in order to reach 
international standards of disclosure. India, in this case, has achieved the highest standard of disclosure 
practice, especially in mandatory disclosure and has made some progress in voluntary disclosure. In 
other words, voluntary disclosure is not as high as mandatory disclosure. However, some voluntary 
information, such as corporate social disclosure, corporate governance, and risk-related voluntary 
information, has been disclosed in the annual reports in the Indian banks to an acceptable level. This 
may be due to the fact that the Indian banking sector has been very closely monitored by regulators, 
and consequently, the disclosure practices, especially at the mandatory level, are found to show a high 
level of compliance. 
The study has considered some corporate attributes in measuring their effect of level of 
disclosure, and reach the conclusion that size, profitability, board composition, and market discipline 
variables are significant, while other variables such as age, assets-in-place, and complexity of business 
are insignificant in explaining the disclosure levels. The study has given an idea at least of how the 
developing countries, especially India, perform the financial reporting duties in general, and how the 
banking sector in particular, does this. Ideally, increased transparency through the disclosure of timely 
and accurate information should enable a bank to access capital markets more efficiently. More 
broadly, market discipline based on this information should contribute to the efficient allocation of 
capital and provide incentives for banks to operate efficiently and to manage and control their risk 
exposures prudently. In particular, increased transparency should reduce the magnitude and frequency 
of bank problems, insofar as enhanced disclosure allows market participants to impose market 
discipline earlier and more effectively. These findings support the public policy advocated by the Basal 
Committee, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and others, to increase disclosure and 
improve transparency in the banking sector. 
The limitation of the research is that it covers a single year, a single country, and one specific 
sector, and in order to understand the nature of variations of overall disclosure, it is necessary to 
undertake a study taking five or ten years’ data. Moreover, as this study represents the Indian banking 
sector’s disclosure practices, the conclusions drawn on the findings would be more realistic by 
considering other financial institutions such as insurance, non-banking sector. 
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Appendix 1 
Disclosure Index (mandatory items) 
 
A Balance sheet items (13) 
1 Capital and its breakdown 
2 Reserve and Surplus and their breakdown 
3 Deposits and its breakdown 
4 Other liabilities and provision and their breakdown 
5 Cash and Balance with RBI and their breakdown 
6 Borrowing and its breakdown 
7 Balance with other banks and their breakdown 
8 Money at call and short notice 
9 Investments and its breakdown 
10 Advances and its breakdown 
11 Fixed assets and their breakdown 
12 Other assets and their breakdown 
13 Contingent liabilities and their breakdown 
B Profit and Loss Account Items (07) 
14 Interest earned and their breakdown 
15 Other income and its breakdown 
16 Interest expenses and its breakdown 
17 Operating expenses and its breakdown 
18 Auditor’s fee 
19 Directors’ fee and allowances 
20 Net profit/loss for the year 
C Board’s Report (05) 
21 Director’s report 
22 Narrative statement of company’s affairs 
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23 Amount of dividend recommended 
24 Narrative discussion of material changes and commitments 
25 Narrative discussion of any changes occurring during the financial year 
D Corporate Governance (44): 
26 Report on Corporate Governance 
27 A statement on philosophy on code of governance 
28 Composition of Board of Directors 
29 Category of directors 
30 Details of attendance of each director at BOD meetings 
31 Number of BOD meetings held and dates 
32 Classification of directors as executive or outsider 
33 Information on management/executive committee of the board 
34 Composition of Audit Committee 
35 The nature of chairman of audit committee 
36 Number of meetings held and date 
37 Brief description of terms of reference of audit committee 
38 Information regarding remuneration committee 
39 Information on remuneration to all the directors/MD 
40 Name of the director heading the shareholders’ grievance committee 
41 Name and designation of compliance officer 
42 Number of shareholders’ complaints received so far 
43 Number not solved to the satisfaction of shareholders 
44 Number of pending complaints 
45 Location and time of last/three AGM’s held 
46 Disclosure of special resolution passed in last/three AGMs 
47 Details of voting pattern 
48 Disclosure of the person conducting the post ballot 
49 Disclosure of materially significant related party transactions 
50 Disclosure of accounting treatment 
51 Details of non-compliance, penalties imposed by SE or SEBI 
52 Disclosure of information on half-yearly report sent to each household of 
shareholders 
53 Disclosure of information on the quarterly result/press release to website. 
54 Disclosure of information on presentations made to institutional investors/analysts 
55 Disclosure of the current AGM, date, time and venue 
56 Disclosure of financial calendar 
57 Disclosure of the date of book closure 
58 Disclosure of the dividend payment date 
59 Disclosure of the listing information on stock exchanges 
60 Disclosure of the stock code 
61 Disclosure of the market price data 
62 Disclosure of the performance 
63 Disclosure of information on the registrar and transfer system 
64 Disclosure of information on the share transfer system 
65 Disclosure of information on the shareholding pattern 
66 Disclosure of information on the distribution of shareholders category wise 
67 Disclosure of the profile of directors appointed during the year 
68 Auditors’ certificate on compliance with condition of corporate governance 
E Management Discussion and Analysis (08): 
69 Report on Management Discussion and Analysis (MDA) 
70 Disclosure of narrative discussion on industry structure and development 
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71 Narrative discussion of opportunities and threats 
72 Disclosure of performance on segment or product wise 
73 Narrative discussion of outlook 
74 Disclosure of information regarding risks and concerns 
75 Disclosure of information on internal control system and adequacies 
76 Discussion of financial performance with respect to operational performance 
77 Discussion of material development in HR including number of people employed 
F RBI Guidelines (24): 
78 Capital adequacy ratio – Tier I and Tier II 
79 Percentage of shareholding of governnment/RBI 
80 Percentage of net non-performing loans to net advances 
81 Related party disclosure 
82 Break-up of provisions and contingencies appearing in profit and loss account 
83 Amount of subordinated debt 
84 Interest income as a percentage of working funds 
85 Non-interest income as a percentage of working funds 
86 Operating profits as a percentage of working funds 
87 Return on assets 
88 Business per employee 
89 Profit per employee 
90 Date on ALM-Maturity pattern of assets/liabilities 
91 Movement of NPA 
92 Exposure to sensitive sectors 
93 Movement in provision for depreciation of investment 
94 Movements in provision for NPA 
95 Information in respect of restructuring etc. undertaken during the year 
96 Cash flow statements - AS 17 
97 Related party disclosure - AS 18 
98 Methods of fixed assets valuation 
99 Method of fixed assets depreciation 
100 Segment reporting 
101 Notes to the accounts 
 
Disclosure Index (Voluntary Items) 
 
A  Background about the bank/general corporate information (06): 
1 Brief narrative history of the Bank 
2 Basic organisation structure/chart/description of corporate structure 
3 General description of business activities 
4 Date of establishment 
5 Official address/registered address/address for correspondence 
6 Web address of the bank/email address 
B Corporate Strategy (03): 
7 Management’s objectives and strategies/corporate vision/motto/statement of 
corporate goals or objectives 
8 Future strategy - Information of future expansion (capital expenditures)/general 
development of business 
9 Impact of strategy on future results 
C Corporate Governance (11): 
10 Details about the chairman (other than name/title)/background of the 
chairman/academic/professional/business experiences 
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11 Details about directors (other than name/title)/background of the directors/ 
academic/professional/business experiences 
12 Number of shares held by directors 
13 List of senior managers (not on the board of directors)/senior management structure 
14 Background of senior managers 
15 Details of CEO’s contact address 
16 Are the independent directors well-defined? 
17 Nature of chairman of the board of directors 
18 Directors’ engagement/directorship of other companies 
19 Picture of all directors/board of directors 
20 Picture of chairperson only 
D Financial Performance (13): 
21 Brief discussion and analysis of a bank’s financial position 
22 Discussion of the bank’s liquidity position and about additional financing 
23 Qualitative forecast of earnings 
24 Return on equity 
25 Net interest margin 
26 Cost–to-income ratio 
27 Earning per share 
28 Risk-weighted assets 
29 Debt–to-equity ratio 
30 Total liquid assets to assets ratio 
31 Total liquid assets to deposit ratio 
32 Loan to deposit ratio 
33 Dividend per share 
E General Risk Management (07): 
34 Discussion of overall risk management philosophy and policy 
35 Narrative discussions on risk assets, risk measurement and monitoring 
36 Discussion on risks rise, how risk are managed and controlled 
37 Whether and how hedges and derivates are used to manage risks 
38 Information on Risk management committee 
39 Information on Assets-liability management committee 
40 Information on Risk management structure 
F Credit Risk Exposure (08): 
41 Disclosure on the magnitude of an institution’s credit exposure on an aggregate 
basis 
42 Information on credit risk management structure 
43 Quantitative information on gross loan positions 
44 Disclosures about the quality of the current loan and other counter-party exposures 
with quantitative information 
45 Amount and details of problem loans and other assets or details by internal risk 
ratings 
46 Disclosure of credit rating system/process 
47  Ageing schedule of past due loans and advances (NPA) 
48  Disclosure about risk management process (use of risk-mitigating tools such as 
collaterals, guarantees, netting agreement, managing concentrations) 
G Market Risk Exposure (04): 
49 General descriptions of market risk segments 
50 Disclosures on value-at-risk (VAR) for interest rate exposure 
51 Disclosures on value-at-risk (VAR) for foreign exchange exposure 
52 Disclosures on value-at-risk (VAR) for trading and derivatives securities exposure 
680 Mohammed Hossain 
H Interest Rate Risk (03): 
 Detailed quantitative information about the nature and extent of interest rate-
sensitive assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet exposures including 
53 (a) Averages 
54 (b) Breakdown of fixed and floating rate items for liabilities 
55 ( c) Assets 
I Currency Risk (03): 
 Summarised data for: 
56 Significant concentrations of foreign exchange exposure by currency 
57 Broken down by assets and liabilities 
58 Maturity of foreign currency assets and liabilities 
J Liquidity Risk Exposure (03): 
59 Information about the firm's available liquid assets as well as sources and uses of 
funds 
60 Information on concentrations of depositors and other fund providers 
61 Maturity information about deposits and other liabilities 
K Accounting Policy Review (02): 
62 Discussion on its accounting policy 
63 Disclosure of accounting standards uses for its accounts 
L Key Non-financial Statistics (08): 
64 Age of key employee 
65 Details of branch location 
66 Number of branch 
67 No. of branch expansion during the year 2002-03 
68 Information on branch computerisations 
69 Information on ATM 
70 Location of ATM and their address 
71 List of top five shareholders of the bank 
M Corporate Social Disclosure (04): 
72 Sponsoring public health, sporting of recreational projects 
73 Information on donations to charitable 
74 Supporting national pride/government.-sponsored campaigns 
75 Information on social banking activities/banking for the society 
N Others (08): 
76  Chairman’s/MD’s report 
77 On-line banking facilities 
78 Information on credit card business 
79 Information on international banking facilities 
80 Information on welfare of employees 
81 Information on ISO 9001: 2000 certification 
82 Graphical presentation of performance indicators 
83 Performance at a glance-3 year 
 
